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THE ROLE OF BLUE SKY LAWS AFTER
NSMIA AND THE JOBS ACT
RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR.†
ABSTRACT
State securities laws—in particular, state laws requiring that
securities offered by issuers be registered with the states—have been an
impediment to the efficient movement of capital to its highest and best
use. The pernicious effects of these laws—generally referred to as “blue
sky laws”—have been felt most acutely by small businesses, a vital
component of our national economy.
It has been difficult to remedy this problem. States and state
regulators have been tenacious in protecting their registration authority
from federal preemption. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
on the other hand, has been reluctant to advocate for preemption and
unwilling to exercise its delegated power to expand preemption by
regulation.
In recent years some progress has been made toward a more
efficient regulation of capital formation, principally as a result of some
congressional preemption of state registration authority. Nonetheless,
state registration provisions continue to impede significantly
businesses’—especially small businesses’—efficient access to external
capital.
Further gains in efficient regulation of capital formation can be
achieved but require actions both by states and the federal government.
States must allocate more resources and effort toward vigorous
enforcement of their antifraud provisions. At the federal level,
Congress must preempt completely state registration authority. This
duty of preemption falls to Congress, because the Commission has
shown a sustained unwillingness to exercise its broad, delegated power
to preempt state registration authority.
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INTRODUCTION

In our system of federalism, it has proven difficult to achieve an
efficient regime regulating capital formation—an overall regime that
facilitates the movement of capital to its highest and best use with a
minimum of transaction costs.
This difficulty is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that
historically our rules governing capital formation have been generated
by our federal government and also by each individual state. In the best
of cases, the good-faith, idiosyncratic views of multiple sovereign
rulemakers and administrators about what is “good” for their
particular citizens may differ. It also is possible, of course, that rank
turf battles could erupt—battles driven not by good-faith
disagreements over “good” regulation but, instead, by less noble
factors or considerations.
In any event, in a system of federalism, we may wind up with an
overall regime that does not correct market imperfections but, instead,
creates additional impediments to the efficient flow of capital to its
highest and best use. Unfortunately, this has been the case in the
United States.
The focus of this Article is on blue sky laws. These are the state
laws that most directly impact capital formation. The laws require that
companies seeking external capital file registration statements with
states1 and prohibit those companies from engaging in deceptive or
manipulative conduct in connection with their capital-raising
activities.2
Historically, these blue sky laws and regulations—in particular,
the state provisions requiring that securities offered by issuers be
registered with the states—have been an impediment within our
market economy to the efficient movement of capital to its highest and
best use. The pernicious effects of these state laws have been felt most
acutely in regard to small-business capital formation.

1. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1956) (requiring the registration of securities).
2. See, e.g., id. § 101 (prohibiting, inter alia, material misstatements in connection with the
sale of securities). In LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, 1 SECURITIES
REGULATION 15 (5th ed. 2013), the authors refer to the “prescription of fraud” and the “policing
of affirmative disclosure of corporate information” as the “basic foundation of any system of
investor protection.”
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In more recent times, the problems wrought by these blue sky laws
have been ameliorated, at least to an extent, by some federal
preemption of state authority over registration.3 This Article
demonstrates, however, a continuing harmful impact of blue sky laws
on the efficient allocation of capital.
Further gains in efficiency in capital formation, particularly capital
formation by small businesses, require the complete elimination of
state authority over registration and the redeployment of state
resources into the enforcement of states’ own antifraud provisions. The
Article shows, however, the difficulties within our system of federalism
in achieving this outcome and argues that any solution to the pernicious
effects of state registration authority depends on Congress’s creating a
comprehensive federal statute that preempts all state authority over
the registration of securities.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history of the
relationship between state and federal governments in the regulation
of capital formation. Part II explains the current role of blue sky laws
in regard to capital-formation regulation. Part III analyzes the extent
to which today’s blue sky laws promote efficient capital allocation. The
Conclusion reiterates the view that although efficiency has improved,
further progress on that score is needed and requires congressional
preemption of state authority over registration and a redeployment of
state regulatory resources.
I. HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
REGULATION (AND REGULATORS) OF CAPITAL FORMATION
A. Before the National Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA)
Two historical facts continue to impact the nature of the rules
governing capital formation within our system of federalism. The first

3. In 1996, Congress enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Broadly stated, NSMIA preempted state registration authority over the offer and sale of
securities (1) listed on a national securities exchange; (2) issued by a registered investment
company; (3) offered and sold to “qualified purchasers,” as defined by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the Commission); and (4) offered and sold under the exemption provided
by 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016). See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012). In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), further preempting
some state authority over registration. For a summary of federal preemption of state authority
over registration, see infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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is that states developed comprehensive statutes governing capital
formation before the federal government passed its securities
legislation.
In 1911, Kansas enacted a broad statute governing the offer and
sale of securities.4 The statute required the registration of securities
and the licensing of persons involved in the business of selling
securities.5 Previously, there were no comprehensive statutes—either
state or federal—regulating the offer and sale of securities,6 although
some states had earlier enacted statutes regulating certain aspects of
capital-formation activities.7
Other states soon followed Kansas’s lead.8 By the time Congress
passed the federal Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), forty-seven of
the forty-eight states as well as the then-territory of Hawaii had
adopted blue sky laws.9
The second significant historical fact is that when Congress passed
the 1933 Act, there was no preemption of state authority over the
registration of securities. Each state and the territory that at the time
required the registration of securities continued to exercise that
authority.10 Predominately, those blue sky regimes were based on a

4. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. See History, KAN. OFFICE OF SEC. COMM’R, http://www.ksc.ks.
gov/index.aspx?nid=154 [https://perma.cc/PW9L-6CVQ].
5. See LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7–8 (1958) (discussing the
content and terms of the act).
6. Authors and scholars have offered interesting accounts of capital-formation activities
before the advent of comprehensive securities legislation. See, e.g., JOHN CHAMBERLAIN, THE
ENTERPRISING AMERICANS: A BUSINESS HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 130–32 (1961)
(describing post-war sales of securities); JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 9–16 (1971) (describing promoter activities in connection with railroad
construction).
7. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 58–60 (discussing early securities laws
in Connecticut, Nevada, and Rhode Island). For an earlier version of this discussion, see LOSS &
COWETT, supra note 5, at 5–7.
8. LOSS & COWETT, supra note 5, at 10 (reporting that within two years of the Kansas act,
twenty-three states had adopted blue sky laws, and that “[a]ll but six of [those] acts were either
identical with the Kansas statute or modeled upon it”).
9. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 65. The authors further report that
“[t]oday all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have
blue sky laws in force.” Id. at 66.
10. It is not entirely clear that the U.S. Congress had authority to regulate capital formation
in 1933. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936) (discussing the scope of Congress’s
commerce power, which “includes transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities
between the citizens of the different states” as well as “embrac[ing] the instruments by which
commerce is carried on”). In 1937, however, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
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qualification theory, not the disclosure theory that was at the heart of
the 1933 Act.11
This framework of federalism for the regulation of capital
formation continued essentially unchanged for over half a century.12
During that time period, an issuer that elected to do a national
distribution of its securities had to meet the federal registration
requirements imposed by the 1933 Act and the separate and individual
registration requirements imposed by states, territories, and the
District of Columbia.13
Over the decades after the enactment of the 1933 Act, there were
some efforts to deal with the burden imposed on capital formation by
the obligation to meet the registration requirements and, in most cases,
the qualification requirements of fifty-plus sovereign jurisdictions. For
example, the Uniform Securities Act, some form of which was adopted
by most states,14 provides for state registration by coordination.15
Essentially, this coordination meant that an issuer could provide its
federal filing package to states, and when the federal filing was
declared effective, the state registrations also became effective.16 The
Uniform Securities Act also provides for an exemption from state
Steel Corp. made it clear that Congress has authority to regulate ordinary industry demonstrably
connected to interstate commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937).
11. Stated simply and generally, in a “qualification” or “merit” regime, an issuer offering
securities must meet certain standards or conditions in connection with the offering. See, e.g.,
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(F) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956)
(prohibiting excessive underwriting commissions). In a “disclosure” regime, the issuer is required
to disclose prescribed investment information to investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (obligating
issuers to disclose investment information to the Commission and investors). An exhaustive
report by the ABA in 1986 concluded that some form of a merit regime was applicable in thirtynine states. ABA Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm.,
Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 788–89 (1986). In an
article I wrote in 1997, I reviewed the registration provisions in a five-state sample and concluded
that all five of the states applied some form of merit standards to registration. Rutheford B.
Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L.
175, 186 n.65 (1997).
12. In 1996, Congress enacted NSMIA, preempting some state authority over registration.
See National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.
13. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
14. Approximately forty jurisdictions (thirty-seven states, two territories, and the District of
Columbia) have “adopted or substantially adopted with modifications” the Uniform Securities
Act. Jurisdictions Adopting the Uniform Securities Act, 2015 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 5500.
15. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303.
16. Id. § 303(c) (stating that a registration statement “automatically becomes effective at the
moment the federal registration statement becomes effective if all the following conditions are
satisfied”).
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registration for an issuer offering its securities that are traded on a
national securities exchange.17
The North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) over time also promulgated and offered to the states for
adoption policies, protocols, and model rules and forms, some of which
were designed to promote better cooperation and uniformity among
the states regarding the blue sky rules governing capital formation.
One example was the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption
(ULOE),18 which was designed to provide a uniform state exemption
from registration for offerings under federal Rule 50519 and Rule 506.20
Two other examples of NASAA initiatives were the Small Company
Offering Registration (SCOR) initiative,21 which is a protocol designed
to provide a coordinated state registration of small offerings made
under federal Rule 50422 or Regulation A,23 and a coordinated-equityreview initiative, which is a protocol designed to coordinate state

17. The Act exempts from registration “any security listed or approved for listing upon
notice of issuance on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the
Midwest Stock Exchange.” Id. § 402(a)(8).
18. See SEC, REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” (1997),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm [https://perma.cc/U5KL-6BWJ] [hereinafter
SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT].
19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2015) (providing an exemption from federal registration
requirements for offerings up to $5 million). On November 21, 2016 the Commission adopted an
amendment to Rule 504 raising the maximum limit of an offering thereunder to $5 million. See
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,494 (Nov.
21, 2016), Securities Act Release 33-10238 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240, 249,
270, 275). In the same release the Commission repealed Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. 81 Fed.
Reg. 83,553 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). It also finalized amendments to Rule 147, 17
C.F.R. § 230.147. 81 Fed. Reg. 83,550–51 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (providing an exemption from federal registration for offerings
without regard to dollar amount).
21. NASAA’s website states:
CR-SCOR provides for coordinated review of an offering of securities in two or more
states located within a geographic group when the offering is intended to be made in
reliance upon an exemption from registration with the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under Rule 504 of SEC Regulation D or SEC Regulation A.
Coordinated Review, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/
corporation-finance/coordinated-review [https://perma.cc/77EH-FRKL].
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. The Commission has adopted an amendment to Rule 504 raising the
maximum offering under that Rule to $5 million. See supra note 19.
23. Regulation A was enacted by the Commission under its delegated authority in the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012). Regulation A (before the JOBS Act and its regulatory
implementation by the Commission) was found at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.262 (2011).
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review of initial public offerings that are the subject of federal
registration.24
Although the states broadly adopted these NASAA initiatives,25
data and other available information show that the initiatives have
been scantly utilized for the offering of securities. Consider, for
example, the SCOR regime, which was adopted by the vast majority of
states.26 In a 2000 article, I gathered information on the use of SCOR
from a sample of ten states.27 The article reported that among the
sample states, Iowa had four SCOR filings in the most recent three
years; Indiana had two SCOR filings in a thirty-two month period;28
Kansas had fifteen, six, and three SCOR filings in the most recent

24. NASAA’s website states: “CR-Equity provides a uniform procedure designed to
coordinate the blue-sky registration process among states in which the issuer seeks to sell its
equity securities.” Coordinated Review, supra note 21. Another website, sponsored by NASAA,
states:
CR-EQUITY provides a uniform procedure designed to coordinate the blue-sky
registration process among states in which the issuer seeks to sell its equity
securities. . . . CR-EQUITY offers issuers registration efficiencies by creating a
uniform scheme of review. . . . CR-EQUITY simplifies the process for resolution of
issues raised during review of the registration application. . . . Finally, CR-EQUITY
offers issuers expedited review. . . . CR-EQUITY generally is intended only for initial
public offerings of common stock, preferred stock, warrants, rights and units comprised
of equity securities.
CR-Equity Overview, COORDINATED REVIEW, http://www.coordinatedreview.org/cr-equity/
overview [https://perma.cc/Q7RG-J7ED].
25. It is reported, for example, that the CR-Equity protocol has been adopted by all but two
jurisdictions. See COORDINATED REVIEW, supra note 24 (“Of the jurisdictions that register
offerings eligible to use CR-EQUITY, all but two currently are participating in the program.”).
Regarding the adoption of ULOE by states, a 1997 SEC report to Congress stated that
“[a]pproximately 30 states have adopted ULOE to some extent.” SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT,
supra note 18. A later sample of ten states indicated that nine of the ten states sampled had
adopted some form of ULOE. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules
Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 419 n.45 (2000). Regarding the adoption of
the CR-SCOR protocol, as of 1996, NASAA reported forty-three jurisdictions had adopted
SCOR or Form U-7. N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, State Adoptions of Small Corporate Offerings
Registration Program and Form U-7, 6-2001 NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 267.
26. As of 2015, approximately forty-five jurisdictions (forty-three states, Puerto Rico, and
the District of Columbia) have adopted SCOR or informally accept SCOR filings. Small
Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-7, 2015 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 6461.
27. Campbell, supra note 25, at 424. In evaluating the use of SCOR, it is good to remember
that there are more than five million small businesses (businesses with fewer than twenty
employees) in the United States. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 99–100 tbl.A6 (2009) (providing data for the year 2006).
28. Campbell, supra note 25, at 424.
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years; and Michigan had a total of twelve SCOR filings over a threeyear period.29
I updated the data in 2015, and those data show that SCOR
registrations are now virtually unused. Currently, SCOR registrations
involving multiple states can be coordinated by a single filing
(Coordinated Review-Small Company Offering Registration or CRSCOR) within four designated geographic areas. SCOR filings can also
be made directly with a single state or multiple states. The totals of all
CR-SCOR registrations in all regions were three in 2012, five in 2013,
and one in 2014.30 In addition, the total of uncoordinated SCOR filings
in the nine sample states (I was unable to get data from one sample
state) was four in 2012, four in 2013, and one in 2014.31

29. Id. at 424–25 n.82.
30. E-mail from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, Assistant Attorney Gen., Md. Div. of Sec., Atl. CRSCOR Region, to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Nov. 20, 2015, 15:10 EST) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Lynn Hammes, Dir., Fin. & Admin.,
Kan. Sec’y Comm’rs Office, Midwest CR-SCOR Region (Nov. 19, 2015); Telephone Interview
with Patricia Loutherback, Dir., Registration Div., Tex. State Sec. Bd., Southwest CR-SCOR
Region (Nov. 19, 2015); Telephone Interview with Sarah Reynolds, Div. of Sec., Wash. State
Dep’t of Fin. Insts., West CR-SCOR Region (Nov. 19, 2015).
31. SCOR filings can now occur through coordinated filing or filing directly in individual
states that have adopted the SCOR filing regime. Out of the ten sample states, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, and Maryland had zero SCOR filings in 2012, 2013, and 2014. I
obtained this information through emails from state securities registration employees to my
research assistant, and through telephone conversations with their enforcement staff. See E-mail
from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, Assistant Attorney Gen., Md. Div. of Sec., to Molly Coffey, Student,
Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Nov. 19, 2015, 06:35 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); E-mail
from Patrick Sanders, Registrations Attorney, Ind. Sec. Div., to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky.
Coll. of Law (Jan. 13, 2016, 09:12 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); E-mail from Steven
Wassom, Exec. Dir., Kan. Sec. Comm’r Office, to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law
(Dec. 23, 2015, 12:05 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with
Anthony Murphy, Registration Branch Manager, Div. of Sec., Ky. Dep’t of Fin. Inst. (Jan. 6,
2016); Telephone Interview with Len Riviere, Deputy Chief Exam’r, Sec. Div., La. Office of Fin.
Inst. (Dec. 28, 2015); Telephone Interview with Paige Turney, Assistant Sec. Adm’r, Office of
Sec., Me. Dep’t of Prof’l and Fin. Regulation (Dec. 28, 2015). Iowa and Michigan both had one
filing in 2013 but zero in 2012 and 2014. E-mail from Mich. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulatory
Affairs (LARA), to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Jan. 13, 2016, 17:54 CST) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Tom Alberts, Dir., Corp. Fin., Iowa
Sec. Bureau (Dec. 22, 2015). Illinois had the most SCOR filings, with two in 2012, two in 2013,
and one in 2014. E-mail from David Finnigan, Senior Enf’t Attorney, Ill. Sec. Dep’t, to author
(Dec. 22, 2015, 11:58 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A 2012 GAO report is generally
consistent with the foregoing, although the report unfortunately is not based on any hard data.
The report states that “[t]he efficacy of the efforts to streamline the state registration process is
unknown.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 15 (2012),

CAMPBELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

11/28/2016 2:46 PM

THE ROLE OF BLUE SKY LAWS AFTER NSMIA

613

Similarly, NASAA’s coordinated-equity-review program is little
used. In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Commission) reported that there had to that date been only two
coordinated equity reviews.32 My 2000 article reported that by late
1999, only seventeen offerings pursuant to a coordinated equity review
had become effective.33 More recent data show the continued,
extremely modest use of coordinated equity reviews. The Pennsylvania
Securities Commission, which coordinates the program, reported that
only one coordinated equity review was filed between 2012 and 2014.34
B. The Fight over Preemption
Starting in the mid-1980s, scholars35 and ultimately Congress
focused on the problems wrought by the fact that each state and the
federal government had a different and independent set of rules
governing capital formation. This led to the introduction of the Capital
Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995,36 which with
significant changes was enacted into law in 1996 as NSMIA.37 In
NSMIA, Congress, for the first time since the passage of the 1933 Act,
preempted some state registration authority.
It was clear in 1996 that Congress if it so chose could preempt state
authority over the registration of securities.38 What Congress finally
enacted in NSMIA, however, was far short of complete preemption of
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDB6-GMTF]. The report continues
as follows:
According to several of the state securities administrators whom we interviewed, they
have not participated in regional reviews or used SCOR forms for Regulation A filings
because there have been so few Regulation A filings in their state. Similarly, a
researcher and securities attorneys with whom we met noted that some of these
methods, like SCOR, have not been widely used because of the low number of
Regulation A filings in recent years.
Id.
32. SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT, supra note 18, at Part III.B.1.a.ii(A).
33. Campbell, supra note 25, at 426.
34. Telephone Interview with Brett Warren, Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Pa. Dep’t of
Banking & Sec. (Dec. 28, 2015).
35. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985) [hereinafter Campbell, Open Attack] (discussing the impact
on capital formation of state requirements regarding registration, merit qualification, regulation
of brokers and dealers, and antifraud provisions).
36. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).
37. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416.
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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states’ registration authority. Briefly stated, NSMIA preempted state
authority in three areas: offerings of securities by mutual funds,39
offerings by companies traded on a national securities exchange,40 and
exempt offerings under Rule 506.41 NSMIA also delegated authority to
the Commission to expand preemption by regulation.42
The debates and adoption process leading to the 1996 enactment
of NSMIA turned out to be a precursor of the future relationship
between state and federal regulators.
In the legislative hearings leading to NSMIA, for example, the
state regulators offered vigorous testimony against preemption,43 and
their effective lobby seems certain to have influenced the congressional
committee considering NSMIA and ultimately Congress to limit
significantly the broader legislative preemption provision initially
proposed in the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization
Act.44 The Commission, on the other hand, refused in its committee
testimony to endorse preemption.45
Over the nearly three decades that followed, the Commission
failed in any meaningful fashion to expand preemption,

39. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (2012) (preempting state registration authority of “a security issued
by an investment company that is registered . . . under the Investment Company Act of 1940”).
40. Id. § 77r(b)(1)(B) (preempting state registration authority over a security “listed, or
authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange”).
41. Id. § 77r(b)(4) (preempting state registration authority over a security “with respect to a
transaction that is exempt from registration . . . pursuant to . . . Commission rules or regulations
issued under section 77(d)2”).
42. Id. § 77r(b)(3) (preempting state registration authority over the “offer or sale of the
security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule”); see infra notes 46–51
and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R.
2131 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong.
307 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2131] (statement of Dee R. Harris, President, North
American Securities Administrators Association) (“NASAA is opposed to the preemption of the
state authority to register and review securities offerings.”).
44. As originally proposed, the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of
1995, H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995), preempted state registration authority over securities issued
pursuant to a section 3(b) exemption under the Securities Act of 1933. If that provision had been
adopted, states would have lost registration authority over offerings under Regulation A, Rule
504, and Rule 505.
45. See Hearings on H.R. 2131, supra note 43, at 105 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission).
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notwithstanding a broad delegation of authority in NSMIA to the
Commission to expand preemption through regulation.46
NSMIA permitted the Commission to preempt by regulation state
registration authority over any offering “to qualified purchasers, as
defined by the Commission by rule.”47 The breadth of this delegation
is made clear on the face of the legislation, which limits the
Commission’s authority to define “qualified purchaser” only by
requiring that the definition must be “consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors.”48 Regarding the “public
interest” limitation, the legislation provides that when in the enactment
of regulations the Commission is required to act in the “public interest,
the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action promotes efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”49
The Commission never used this delegated authority to expand
preemption, notwithstanding the apparent inefficiency of a registration
regime that may impose fifty-plus separate registration statutes on a
company that engages in a broad solicitation for external capital and
the overwhelming evidence that state authority over registration had
wrecked both Regulation A offerings50 and Regulation D offerings.51
Although the Commission was unwilling to advocate on behalf of
preemption or expand preemption by regulation, the antipreemption
46. The Commission did, however, expand the preemption regarding the offer and sale of
securities traded on a national exchange by defining securities traded on the Pacific Exchange as
“covered securities” preempted from state registration authority. Covered Securities Pursuant to
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7494, 66
S.E.C. Docket 583 (Jan. 2, 1998). In 2001 the Commission proposed to define “qualified
purchaser” as “any accredited investor” under Regulation D. Defining the Term “Qualified
Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of 1933, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001). The
Commission failed to adopt this proposal.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 77b(b).
50. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “a Moderate
Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 106–12 (2006). Prior to the Commission’s most recent
amendments, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2015), Regulation A provided an exemption from
federal regulation requirements for offerings up to $5 million, predicated on disclosure of
prescribed investment information. Issuers had abandoned the use of this exemption, due largely
to state registration requirements. See Campbell, supra, at 110–12.
51. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919 (2011) (describing
how state authority over registration created problems with Regulation D and providing remedial
actions for the problems).
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forces under the leadership of state regulators and NASAA continued
to wage an aggressive and imaginative campaign against preemption.
For example, an exposure draft52 of the Dodd-Frank Act,53 which
was to be the blueprint for dealing with the Wall Street failures seen as
the cause of the recession of 2008, had a provision buried deep in the
roughly 1,200 pages of the proposed legislation that would have
repealed the preemption of state registration authority over Rule 506
offerings.54 The provision was not part of the final Dodd-Frank Act.
NASAA also established a website designed to coordinate better
the efforts to limit and roll back preemption of state authority over
registration.55
But perhaps the most aggressive initiative against any expansion
of preemption occurred in connection with the regulatory
implementation of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act).56
Title IV of the JOBS Act57 is the basis for the new Regulation A+
rules.58 The Act delegates to the Commission the authority to preempt
by regulation state registration authority over Regulation A+ offerings,
provided the securities in the offerings are offered or sold to a
“qualified purchaser.”59
State regulators and antipreemption forces fought this perceived
threat to state registration authority on multiple fronts. State

52. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG.,
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2009 (Comm. Print 2009) (introduced by
Sen. Chris Dodd).
53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
54. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 680–
81 (referencing § 928, which aimed to give state regulators authority over Regulation D offerings).
55. NASAA Preemption Resource Center, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.
org/issues-and-advocacy/nasaa-preemption-resource-center/#Challenges to State Regulatory
Authority [https://perma.cc/U8SP-MAMK].
56. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-206, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
57. Id. §§ 401–402, 126 Stat. at 323–25.
58. Id. § 401, 126 Stat. at 324 (giving the Commission the authority “by rule or
regulation [to] add a class of securities to the securities exempted pursuant to this section”
under § 401(b)(2)). The new Regulation A+ Rules, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2016), provide an
exemption from federal registration requirements for offerings by companies that are not subject
to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. The limit on the offering is $50 million and is
predicated on the company providing investment information to investors. Id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012).
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regulators wrote numerous letters of comment on the proposed
regulations, strongly urging the Commission against any significant
regulatory preemption of state authority over Regulation A+
offerings.60 U.S. senators and representatives were convinced to write
letters directly to the chair of the Commission, urging her to eschew or
limit any preemption of state registration authority.61 Finally, after the
Commission issued its final rules under the new Regulation A+
preempting state registration authority over larger, Tier 2 Regulation
A+ offerings, state regulators unleashed a new tactic: suing the
Commission and claiming that the Commission exceeded its delegated
authority by expanding preemption to cover Tier 2 offerings under the
new Regulation A+.62
The strategies and roles of the Commission and state regulators
that were first established in the context of NSMIA, therefore,
continue to this day, and this relationship seems unlikely to change. It
is a relationship that has been important in defining today’s rules
governing capital formation and that will continue to be important in
defining society’s rules in the future. State regulators have vigorously
and seemingly with renewed energy opposed the expansion of
preemption. The Commission, on the other hand, has been unwilling
to any significant degree to promote preemption.63

60. Amendments to Regulation A, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806,
21,857–58, 21,857 n. 772 (Apr. 20, 2015).
61. See id. (citing letters written by U.S. senators and representatives as “object[ing] to the
preemption of state securities law registration and qualification requirements” in an Exchange
Act Release).
62. See Petition for Review at 1–2, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015),
consolidated with Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1149) (filing a petition
“relating to the preemption of state securities law registration and qualification requirements for
certain Regulation A securities,” and asking for a permanent injunction on the basis that the rules
are “arbitrary, [and] capricious”); see also Opening Brief of Petitioners Monica J. Lindeen and
William F. Galvin at 54–55, Lindeen, 825 F.3d 646 (No. 15-1149). The court has now rendered its
opinion, holding that the Commission did not exceed its delegated authority in preempting state
registration authority over Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+. Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 656–58.
63. See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. The only exception to this unwillingness
is the Commission’s preemption of state authority over Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings.
17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015). The Commission correctly perceived that it was under pressure from
Congress to do something about preemption over Regulation A+ offerings because it was the
second time Congress had delegated similar authority to the Commission to expand preemption
through regulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (preempting state registration authority over the
“offer or sale of the security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule”). The
Commission’s regulatory preemption in its Regulation A+ rules is modest, however, only
preempting state authority over Tier 2 offerings and leaving Tier 1 offerings—a regulatory regime
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Blue sky laws have an important role in the governance of capital
formation. States generally retain authority to make and enforce
antifraud rules. States also retain significant authority over
registration, although as a result of preemption, states have in recent
years lost some authority in this area.
A. States’ Authority to Enact and Enforce Antifraud Rules
Today, states generally retain authority to enact and enforce their
own antifraud rules. NSMIA specifically preserves these rights for
states,64 and states’ securities laws typically have strong antifraud rules
that are similar to federal antifraud rules.65 Stated broadly, these state
antifraud provisions prohibit issuers soliciting external capital from
making material misstatements and require those issuers to disclose all
material facts.66
A violation of state antifraud rules by an issuer generates the risk
of substantial state-based economic penalties imposed on the issuer in

crafted for smaller Regulation A+ offerings—subject to state registration authority. This
preemption is unlikely to have any material impact on capital formation, since Tier 2 offerings
appear to be an unattractive way to raise capital. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (preempting some state authority only over “registration or
qualification”); id. § 77r(c)(1) (“[A]ny State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State
to investigate and bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or securities
transactions . . . (A) with respect to—(i) fraud or deceit . . . .”).
65. For example, section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act makes it
unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956).
66. See, e.g., id.
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the form of investors’ private rights of recovery,67 as well as
administrative68 and criminal sanctions.69
These private and governmental state sanctions, therefore,
amount to a significant role for blue sky laws. State antifraud
provisions increase issuers’ costs of committing fraud in connection
with their capital-raising efforts and thus incentivize issuers to provide
investors with an efficient level of complete and accurate investment
information. These state antifraud provisions can both raise the
amount of the penalty and, perhaps even more importantly, raise the
probability of detection and prosecution of the miscreant.70 This latter
effect—raising the probability of detection and prosecution—depends
to a significant degree on the state’s willingness to invest its own
resources in the enforcement of its antifraud rules.
B. States’ Authority over Registration
As suggested in Part I, states’ securities registration role today is
complex. It therefore requires a more extensive explanation than what
was offered in regard to states’ antifraud authority.
To date, there has been a partial preemption of state authority
over registration. This preemption started with NSMIA and was
recently expanded in the JOBS Act and its final regulations.

67. Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly provides a private right of action
against one that offers or sells securities through “any untrue statement of a material fact.”
Id. § 410. That provision bears close resemblance to section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. Compare
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (providing a cause of action when one offers or sells securities “by
means . . . which include[] an untrue statement of a material fact”), with UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410
(providing a cause of action when one “offers or sells a security by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact”). The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) and 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), has had some impact on private rights of recovery
under state antifraud provisions. SLUSA preempts the authority of state courts over some private
actions filed under state antifraud provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f); id. § 77p(b). The
preemption generally applies only to class actions involving the securities of companies traded on
a national exchange. See generally DONNA N. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V.
SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 445–57 (3d ed.
2011).
68. Section 408 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly authorizes state administrators to
institute injunction actions against those violating the provisions of the Act. UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 408.
69. Section 409 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly authorizes criminal penalties,
including imprisonment, for the “willful[]” violation of its provisions. Id. § 409.
70. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
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The most significant preemption by NSMIA was the preemption
of state registration authority over Rule 506 offerings.71 That
preemption eliminated state registration authority over thousands of
offerings by issuers each year. For example, data that I developed show
that over a twenty-five-month period during 2008–2010, there were
more than 25,000 Rule 506 offerings.72 More recent data developed by
Professor Manning Warren show a total of 32,166 Rule 506 offerings
over a later eighteen-month period.73
NSMIA also preempted state registration authority over offerings
by companies with exchange-traded securities.74 While preempting
state registration authority over offerings by such companies is
apparently significant since it preempts state registration authority
over most larger publicly traded issuers,75 NSMIA changed less in that
regard than may at first appear. That is because prior to the effective
date of NSMIA, most blue sky laws had an exemption from state
registration for offerings by these companies.76
The JOBS Act in 2012 generated two other preemptions of state
authority over registration. First, the statute itself preempts state
registration authority over offerings under the newly implemented
crowdfunding exemption.77 Under this exemption, as implemented by
the final Commission rules,78 companies not subject to the periodic
71. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (preempting state registration authority over the issuance of a
security “with respect to a transaction that is exempt from registration . . . pursuant
to . . . (F) Commission rules or regulations issued under section 77d(2)”).
72. Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 51, at 926 tbl.I.
73. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements,
68 SMU L. REV. 899, 905 tbl.1 (2015).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A)–(B). NSMIA also preempts state registration authority over
securities issued by registered investment companies. Id. § 77r(b)(2).
75. There are currently, for example, approximately 3,137 companies listed on NASDAQ,
3,168 listed on NYSE, and 366 listed on the AMEX. See Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, &
AMEX), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/company-list.aspx [http://perma.cc/F8YN
-DD2N].
76. Exchange Exemptions, 2016 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 6401 (listing forty-six states as
having exchange-traded exemptions from state registration).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); id. § 77d-1. The crowdfunding proposal generated a significant
amount of scholarship and comment. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and
the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (2014) (discussing
the impact of crowdfunding on securities regulation in the United States); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inept Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 (2014) (same).
78. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
200).
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reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 193479 (the
1934 Act) can sell up to $1 million in securities during a twelve-month
period.80 Investors are limited as to how much each may purchase.81
The offering must be conducted exclusively through the website of an
intermediary (a broker or a “funding portal”),82 and the issuer is strictly
limited regarding any advertising of the offering.83 The issuer is
required to file with the Commission and disclose investment
information both at the time of the offering (ex ante disclosures)84 and
on a periodic basis following the offering (ex post disclosures).85
The JOBS Act, as implemented by the final Commission rules,86
also preempts state registration authority over some offerings under
the new Regulation A+ rules. The new Regulation A+ rules87 provide
an exemption from registration that is built on the same structure as
the pre-JOBS Act Regulation A exemption. Thus the Regulation A+
exemption requires the issuer to file with the Commission and disclose
to investors a significant amount of investment information both ex
ante88 and ex post.89 The amount of investment information is scaled,
depending on the size of the offering. More information is required in
Tier 2 offerings (offerings of up to $50 million) than is required in Tier
1 offerings (offerings of up to $20 million).90 The Regulation A+
exemption is not available to issuers subject to the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act.91

79. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(b)(2) (2015) (exemption is unavailable for sales by issuers “subject
to the requirement to file reports pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934”).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A).
81. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 227.204.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C).
83. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2).
84. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201, 227.203.
85. Id. §§ 227.202–.203.
86. Amendments to Regulation A, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806
(Apr. 20, 2015).
87. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263.
88. Id. § 230.251(d).
89. Id. § 230.257(d).
90. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (comparing Form 1-A, Part F/S(b), financial statements
required for Tier 1 offerings, with Part F/S(c), financial statements required for Tier 2 offerings).
91. Id. § 230.251(a) (stating that the exemption is only available to offerings by an issuer “not
subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”).
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The statute authorizing Regulation A+ delegated to the
Commission authority to preempt state registration authority.92 In its
final rules, the Commission chose to preempt state registration
authority over Tier 2 offerings (offerings up to $50 million) but not
over Tier 1 offerings (offerings up to $20 million).93
As noted above, shortly after the final Regulation A+ rules were
published, a suit was filed that petitioned the court for a permanent
injunction against the Commission’s rules regarding preemption.94 The
bases for the petition included a claim that the Commission exceeded
its delegated authority by preempting state registration authority over
Tier 2 offerings.95 In a recent opinion, the D.C. Circuit rejected that
argument, holding that the Commission’s rule preempting state
registration authority over Tier 2 offerings was within the
congressional delegation of power to the Commission.96
In summary, state authority over registration has been eliminated
with respect to: (1) offerings under Rule 506 (now including public
offerings, if purchasers are limited to “accredited investors”97); (2)
92. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012). That section preempts state registration authority over
[a] security . . . with respect to a transaction that is exempt from
registration . . . pursuant to . . . a rule or regulation adopted pursuant to section
77c(b)(2) of this title and such security is . . . offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as
defined by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (3) with respect to that purchase or
sale.
Id. The reference to “paragraph (3)” above is a reference to part of the original NSMIA, and that
paragraph, after authorizing the Commission to preempt by regulation state registration
authority, goes on to state, “In prescribing such rule, the Commission may define the term
‘qualified purchaser’ differently with respect to different categories of securities, consistent with
the public interest and the protection of investors.” Id. § 77r(b)(3). When the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider whether an action is “in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” Id. § 77b(b).
93. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,899 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.256)
(defining a “qualified purchaser” as “any person to whom securities are offered or sold in a Tier
2 offering [of Regulation A]”). As originally proposed, Rule 256 defined a “qualified purchaser”
as “any offeree of such [Regulation A+] security and, in a Tier 2 offering, any purchaser of such
security.” Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 4003 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.256).
94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 62.
96. Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 656–58 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
97. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,804 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)).
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offerings by issuers of its securities that are traded on a national
exchange; (3) Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings; and (4) crowdfunding
offerings of up to $1 million offered only over the Internet.98
Essentially all other securities offerings by issuers are subject to
state registration requirements. These include: (1) registered offerings
by issuers of securities that are not traded on a national exchange;
(2) private placements under the common law of section 4(a)(2); (3)
offerings under Rule 504;99 (4) offerings under Rule 505;100 (5) Tier 1
offerings under Regulation A+; and (6) intrastate offerings under Rule
147.
As a result, although the scope of state authority has to some
degree been constricted by preemption, blue sky laws continue to play
a significant role in capital formation with regard to registration
obligations. This appears to be most particularly true in connection
with small-business capital formation, since the types of offerings listed
in the immediately preceding paragraph appear attractive to and,
indeed, are generally designed to accommodate the needs of small
businesses.
Practically, however, state registration authority over smallbusiness capital formation has been further reduced as a result of small
issuers abandoning capital-formation strategies that are subject to state
registration authority.
For example, at the time the JOBS Act was passed, states
exercised registration authority over Regulation A offerings. Issuers,
however, had essentially abandoned Regulation A as a vehicle for
capital formation.101

98. The extent to which crowdfunding will be widely—and effectively—used is still a
mystery. Certainly it has attracted enormous interest, suggesting that it will be widely used by
small issuers. But it has challenges. There are significant ex ante and ex post disclosure
requirements. It also appears that the strict limitation on issuer advertising will require issuers
using crowdfunding to forego more traditional solicitations. See supra notes 81–85 and
accompanying text.
99. The Commission has adopted an amendment raising the maximum limit of a Rule 504
offering to $5 million. See supra note 19.
100. The Commission has adopted an amendment repealing Rule 505. See supra note 19.
101. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital
Formation: The Impact—if Any—of the JOBS Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 822 tbl.II (2014) (showing
that the average annual number of Regulation A filings from 1995 through 2004 was 7.8 and from
2005 through 2011 was 23.1).
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Under the new Regulation A+ rules, states will continue to
exercise registration authority over Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings.102
It is unlikely, however, that Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings will attract
much usage from issuers, because the requirements for a Tier 1
Regulation A+ offering are remarkably similar to the requirements for
a pre-JOBS Act Regulation A offering.103
Preliminary data support the assumption that there will be very
few smaller, Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+. For example,
between the effective date of Regulation A+ (June 19, 2015) and May
24, 2016, there were only thirty-seven Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings
filed with the Commission.104 During that same period there also were
twenty-five Tier 2 offerings of $20 million or less filed with the
Commission, a range within which issuers could have relied on Tier 1
rules.105
Similarly, data demonstrate that small offerings under Regulation
D have largely abandoned Rule 504 and Rule 505—offerings that are
subject to state registration authority—in favor of Rule 506 offerings,
in which state authority over registration is preempted.106 Data from a
twenty-five-month period before the JOBS Act was enacted show that
approximately 79 percent of all Regulation D offerings of $1 million or
less—offerings that were within the size limit for a Rule 504
offering—were instead made under the more demanding requirements
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
104. Regulation A+ data were obtained from the subscription-only Lexis Securities Mosaic
website. See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com
[https://perma.cc/YB43-NPJH] (click “SEC Filings” tab; then follow “SEC Filings” hyperlink;
then search “Form 1-A”). Following the passage of the JOBS Act, NASAA adopted a new
coordinated-review regime for offerings under Regulation A+. N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N,
NASAA COORDINATED REVIEW OF REGULATION A OFFERINGS REVIEW PROTOCOL (2014),
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NASAA-Regulation-A-Review-Protocolfinal-Adopted-March-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/48FR-AD3G]. NASAA reported that the regime
was adopted by forty-nine of its fifty-three members. Amendments to Regulation A, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,806, 21,861 n. 826 (Apr. 20, 2015). As of June 2, 2016, only ten coordinated reviews for Tier 1
offerings had been filed with the states. E-mail from Faith L. Anderson, Esq., Chief of
Registration & Regulatory Affairs, Wash. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. Sec. Div., to author (June 2, 2016,
17:17 EST) (on file with author).
105. See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, supra note 104.
106. To capture the full benefits of a Rule 506 offering, issuers in these small offerings
overwhelmingly limit them to “accredited investors.” See Campbell, supra note 51, at 930 tbl.VII
(noting that 88.3 percent of Rule 506 offerings of $1 million or less were limited to “accredited
investors” and 9l.8 percent of Rule 506 offerings of $1 million to $5 million were limited to
“accredited investors”).
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of Rule 506.107 Approximately 92 percent of offerings of $1 million to
$5 million—offerings that were within the size limit of Rule 505—were
moved to a Rule 506 offering.108
Data from Professor Manning Warren show that more recently
only about 1.3 percent of all Regulation D offerings are made pursuant
to Rule 504, and only about 2.5 percent of Regulation D offerings are
made pursuant to Rule 505.109 Other data show, however, that
approximately 55 percent of all Regulation D offerings are within a size
range that would qualify for a Rule 504 or Rule 505 offering.110
A recent Commission proposal regarding the intrastate exemption
of Rule 147111 may also generate some migration from, or at least
diminished use of, offerings under that exemption. The Commission’s
proposal relaxes the requirements for Rule 147 offerings,112 which
would seem to encourage the use of this federal exemption over which
the states still retain registration authority. The proposal, however,
imposes a new requirement for the federal exemption.
Under the proposal, the federal exemption under Rule 147
requires the offering to either be registered under the state’s blue sky
laws or meet the requirements for the particular state’s crowdfunding
exemption from registration.113 If adopted, the practical effect of this
new requirement will be that issuers are no longer able to coordinate a
Rule 147 offering with, for example, a state small-offering
exemption.114 The irony here is that the proposed amendments to Rule

107. Id. at 928 tbl.III.
108. Id. at 928 tbl.IV.
109. Warren, supra note 73, at 903 fig.1 (analyzing 450 Rule 504 offerings and 824 Rule 505
offerings out of a total of 34,199 Regulation D offerings in the sample).
110. See Campbell, supra note 51, at 927 (“[A]pproximately 55 percent of the Regulation D
offerings in our 27,000 sample were for amounts of $5 million or less.”).
111. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg.
69,786 (proposed Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
112. Id. at 69,831–32 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (relaxing the “doing business”
requirement).
113. Id. at 69,831–32 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(a)). Registration of the offering
under blue sky laws seems unlikely, due to the expense of state registration.
114. On November 21, 2016, the Commission adopted final amendments to Rule 147.
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
33-10328, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,494 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240,
249, 270, 275). The amendments are to be effective on April 20, 2017. Id. at 83,494. The final
amendments omit any requirement that the Rule 147 offering be registered with the state
or compliant with the state’s crowdfunding exemption. Id. at 83,550–51 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.147).
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147, which are seemingly designed to enhance the significance of and
reliance on state registration authority to protect investors, may
actually drive a portion of these offerings into other types of offerings
that preempt state registration authority.
Thus, although small issuers—as opposed to larger companies
with large capital needs—are most likely to be subject to state
registration authority, one must realize that these small businesses
have to a degree abandoned capital-formation strategies that are
subject to state registration authority.
*

*

*

Today, blue sky laws continue to play a significant role in
governing capital formation. States invariably have laws that prohibit
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. States also
exercise some authority over registration of securities, although that
authority has been diminished somewhat by federal statutory
preemption. Data also show that small businesses often deal with state
registration by restructuring their transactions to meet the
requirements for a federal exemption that preempts state registration
authority.
III. THE EFFICIENCY OF TODAY’S BLUE SKY LAWS
Although progress has been slow and somewhat messy, today’s
blue sky laws are considerably more efficient than in prior periods.
Regulatory efficiency can be further enhanced, however, by states
focusing additional attention and resources on the enforcement of their
own antifraud provisions and by further federal preemption of state
registration authority, especially in regard to small-business capitalformation activities.
A. State Antifraud Rules
Blue sky laws that prohibit fraud, deception, or manipulative
conduct in connection with the sale of securities make economic sense,
particularly when backed up by administrative and criminal sanctions
and private rights of recovery. These state laws, properly enforced,
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incentivize the issuer to disclose an efficient level of investment
information to investors.115
Economists may view potential criminals and law-breakers as
rational calculators who commit bad acts only when the anticipated
benefits to the perpetrator exceed the perpetrator’s anticipated costs
of committing the bad act.116 States can increase the perpetrator’s
penalty costs of her bad conduct by increasing the actual penalty (for
example, higher fines and increased jail time and civil fines) or by
increasing the probability of detection and conviction.117
State antifraud provisions seem likely to promote an efficient
allocation of capital by allowing states to impose higher penalty costs
on perpetrators of manipulation or deception in connection with the
offer and sale of securities. Congress’s decision in NSMIA not to
preempt state antifraud authority appears, therefore, to have been
economically sound.118
Indeed, efficiency may be further enhanced if states invest more
in antifraud enforcement. States might accomplish this by reallocating
resources away from the enforcement and administration of state
registration rules and reinvesting those resources in the vigorous
enforcement of the states’ antifraud rules.
B. State Rules Requiring the Registration of Securities
Blue sky laws granting states authority over registration were,
prior to NSMIA, impossible to justify as promoting an economically
efficient allocation of capital.119 State authority over registration during
that time not only failed to facilitate the movement of capital to its
highest and best use but also in many instances significantly impeded
the efficient allocation of capital. Subjecting capital formation to fifty-

115. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
116. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 278–87 (8th ed. 2011). Posner
explains the view that persons committing crimes may be “rational calculators” who determine
whether to commit a crime on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Id. The “costs” to the
perpetrator include the penalty costs, which are the perceived present negative value to the
perpetrator of detection and punishment. Id.
117. Id.
118. States may actually enjoy efficiencies compared to federal authorities in prosecuting
these economically bad acts. For example, the proximity of state regulators to the actual
perpetration of the fraud may make the detection and gathering of information less expensive.
119. See Campbell, supra note 35, at 557–67 (discussing the inefficient allocation of capital
resulting from blue sky laws granting states authority over registration before NSMIA).
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plus sets of independent rules governing registration increased offering
costs with no apparent efficiency benefits.
Regarding the increase in offering costs, assume a situation before
NSMIA in which a business announced an offering of its securities by
posting information about the offering on its website or by advertising
to investors in a widely distributed publication. In such a case the
business that was seeking capital would likely have been subject to the
separate and individual registration requirements of each of the fiftyplus jurisdictions that had blue sky laws. In each state, therefore, the
issuer would have been required to underwrite the costs of either
registering its securities under the registration provisions of that
particular state or meeting the particular state’s requirements for an
exemption from registration. Even if the offering had been limited to
four states, the business soliciting for investors would have had to
underwrite the costs of registration or qualifying for an exemption
from registration in each of the four states.
State registration, however, generated no apparent material gain
in investor protection or efficiency. Investors without the benefit of
blue sky registration provisions would have been protected by federal
and state antifraud provisions, which required the issuer to disclose all
material facts. Investors also would have been protected by federal
registration requirements, which would have required the issuer either
to file a registration statement with the Commission and provide a
prospectus to investors or to qualify for an exemption from the
registration requirement. Imposing fifty-plus additional state
registration regimes on top of these significant obligations of the issuer
would have added no material increase in investor protection or
efficiency.
Partial preemption in NSMIA and the JOBS Act of state authority
over registration, however, has enhanced efficiency. Now, Rule 506
offerings, offerings by companies traded on a national securities
exchange, crowdfunding offerings, and Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings
are subject to a single, federal set of rules respecting registration. The
registration regime in those cases is under the administrative oversight
of the Commission, the most professional, balanced, and resource-rich
agency operating in this area. That amounts to progress in establishing
an overall regulatory system that is efficient—one that enhances the
allocation of capital to the highest and best use at the lowest
transaction costs.
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Still, as is the case in the enforcement of antifraud rules, there is
work left to be done, especially in the area of small-business capital
formation. Small businesses are vital to our national economy.120 They
face unique obstacles in their search for external capital. Most
importantly, their offerings involve high relative transaction costs,121
and they are usually unable to secure financial intermediation.122
Imposing fifty-plus registration regimes on these offerings, therefore,
is especially burdensome on these very important small businesses.
After the implementation of NSMIA and the JOBS Act, small
businesses can secure the benefit of preemption for their offerings by
a Rule 506 offering limited to accredited investors123 or by
crowdfunding.124 Each of these is economically sound and helpful to
small businesses, but each is significantly limited. For example, in Rule
506 offerings limited to accredited investors, those investors may
amount to 5 percent of the total population,125 excluding perhaps 95
120. There are more than five million small businesses (businesses with fewer than twenty
employees) in the United States. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 99–100 tbl.A.6 (2009) (data for year 2006). In recent times, these
small businesses have accounted for slightly less than 20 percent of total employment in the
United States. Id. at 101 tbl.A.7 (data for year 2006). For a more detailed historical look at the
significance of small business, see Campbell, supra note 50, at 84–86.
121. “Relative transaction costs” are the offering costs divided by the total size of the offering.
Thus, in a $100 million deal, offering costs of $1 million generate relative transaction costs of only
1 percent. In a $1 million deal, offering costs of $1 million generate relative transaction costs of
100 percent, which kills the offering. Data that I developed show 28.9 percent of all Regulation D
offerings were for $1 million or less, and 54.8 percent of all Regulation D offerings were for $5
million or less. Campbell, supra note 51, at 927 tbl.II.
122. Data that I developed reflect financial intermediation in only 5.8 percent of Regulation
D offerings of $1 million or less. Id. at 931 tbl.IX.
123. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,804 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)). Although Rule 506 does not require that all investors be accredited, small
Rule 506 offerings overwhelmingly are limited to accredited investors in order to relieve small
issuers from burdensome requirements, such as disclosures, sophistication of investors, and
prohibition against general advertising, of Rule 506 offerings involving unaccredited investors.
See Campbell, supra note 51, at 932–33.
124. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200).
Under the new final Regulation A+ rules, small issuers can also achieve preemption by migrating
to Tier 2 offerings. The requirements for Tier 2—most importantly, the disclosure requirements—
impose burdens that make Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+ unattractive to offerings
involving small amounts of securities. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. Preliminary
data suggest that only a few small Regulation A+ offerings migrate to Tier 2. See supra notes
104–05 and accompanying text.
125. Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax Returns for 2012, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer
2015, at 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-inhint-id1510.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8J-FQR8]
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percent of the population from the investment opportunity and small
businesses from a significant demand for their securities.
Crowdfunding, for example, limits sales strategies to posting the offer
on the Internet.126 Obviously, not all potential investors are reached
through this method, and the crowdfunding rules severely restrict the
issuer from other, more traditional, face-to-face and personalized
selling techniques.127
To compete and survive, small businesses need to utilize other
federal exemptions from registration, such as Rule 504, Rule 505, and
Tier 1 Regulation A+, as avenues to external capital. But state
registration requirements may block access to these types of offerings.
As described above, small businesses have to a large extent abandoned
offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 because of the requirements of
state registration provisions, and preliminary data indicate that small
businesses are not using Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+ for the
same reason.
Efficiency in registration rules requires one set of rules generated
by the most efficient rulemaker. In short, efficiency requires complete
preemption of state authority over registration, leaving the federal
government, acting through Congress and the Commission, as the sole
rulemaker regarding the registration of securities.128

(providing that approximately 3.62 percent of all 2012 tax returns reported an adjusted gross
income of $200,000 or more). For tax year 2007, see Justin Bryan, High Income Tax Returns for
2007, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2010, at 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10sprbulhiin
ret07.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7NX-FE4Q] (providing that 3.17 percent of all 2007 tax returns
reported an adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more).
126. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (2015).
127. See id. § 227.204.
128. The recently proposed amendment to Rule 147 offers an interesting suggestion, however,
regarding a possibly efficient role for states’ authority over registration. For a discussion of this
proposal, see supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. If one believes that section 3(a)(11)’s
intrastate exemption is based on the assumption that these local offerings within a single state
should be a matter for state regulation, then it may make some sense for the federal government
essentially to turn the matter over to the states. That would require the Commission to relax and
clarify the federal regulation for the intrastate exemption. Reducing the importance and burden
of federal regulation in that manner would mean that there would be only one meaningful set of
rules governing registration, and that would be the rules of the single state in which the offering
occurred.
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CONCLUSION
The history of society’s regulation of capital formation tells us
much about where we are today and where we may be headed in this
important economic matter.
The failure of Congress in 1933 to take away state authority over
registration was a mistake. But, after all, states were there before the
federal government, and in 1933 at the depth of the Great Depression,
legislators likely did not think of the dangers to a market economy of
overregulation of capital formation.
Once this dual regulation was set in place within our system of
federalism, however, it became difficult to correct. States and state
regulators, it turned out, were tenacious defenders of their authority
over the registration of securities. The Commission, on the other hand,
was unwilling to advocate on behalf of preemption and reluctant to
expand preemption by regulation. The Commission failed to act in this
regard notwithstanding a broad delegation of authority from Congress
to preempt state registration authority and clear evidence that
businesses—especially small businesses—were struggling under the
burdens and inefficiencies of state registration requirements.
But some progress toward efficient regulation of capital formation
has by this point been made. Principally, this is the result of partial
congressional preemption of state registration authority and
Congress’s decision not to preempt states’ authority over the
enforcement of state antifraud rules.
Efficient regulation can be further enhanced by states reallocating
resources to enforcement of state antifraud provisions and by
complete preemption of state authority over registration. With regard
to further preemption of state registration authority, history
suggests—unfortunately, rather strongly—that only Congress can
effect this goal. States, certainly, will not voluntarily surrender their
authority over registration, and there is no indication that the
Commission can overcome its longstanding reluctance to expand
preemption by regulation. Any improvement in the efficient regulation
of capital formation, especially small-business capital formation, will
require congressional action.

